Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)

1951

Jack W. McCollum v. J. V. Clothier : Brief of Plaintiff
and Respondent
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
Clyde C. Patterson; Richard L. Stine; Counsel for Plaintiff and Respondent;
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, McCollum v. Clothier, No. 7721 (Utah Supreme Court, 1951).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/1567

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

u.
~-.h.

IN THE SUPREME .COURT
. ' . ~~\of ·the
STATE OF.

UTAH

JACK W. McCOLLUM,

Praimtjff citulJI&spJJnilent, ·
'~

-

vs.

.

t

. -

J. V. CLOTHIER, .

.

.

·.

D~rtdant and Appellant.

t.l

No.· 7721

.
J

,

:'

~

:.

BRI~F

OF PLAINTIFF AND REJSPONDENT

CLYDE C. PATTERSON,
RICHARD L. STINE,
Counsel for Plaintiff
and Respondent.
'

... .,..

;·~~~~--~--------------~------------~
J.O.Wnon·P1111tTIN.
C"ii.;IIIDIItiUTAH
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library.
Funding for digitization
provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

INDEX
Page No.
STATE~IENT

OF FACTS ________________________________________________ 1

ARGUMENT ------------------------------------------------------------------------ 8
POINT I.
THE FINDINGS OF FACT AND JUDGMENT
ENTERED THEREON ARE SUPPORTED
BY THE EVIDENCE AND ARE NOT CONTRARY THERETO -------------------------------------------------------- 8
POINT II.
THE COURT DID NOT MISLEAD COUNSEL
FOR DEFENDANT INTO NOT PUTTING IN
THE EVIDENCE OF FLOYD SIMPSON FOR
THE COURT DID NOT INDICATE ITS INTENTION TO ENTER JUDGMENT FOR
THE DEFENDANT UNTIL BOTH SIDES
HAD RESTED, AND FURTHER, DEFENDANT'S OWN NEGLECT WAS THE CAUSE
OF LOSING SIMPSON'S TESTIMONY, ASSUMING THAT IT WOULD HAVE BEEN
BENEFICIAL -----------·-··············---------------------------------------15
CONCLUSION ----------·-----------------------·········-···--·--------------------17

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Page No.
CASES CITED
City Ice & Fuel Co. v. Bright, 73 Fed. (2) 461. ...............14
Gleason v. Salt Lake City, 94 Utah 1, 74 P. (2)
.1225 ···-------------------····---------------------------- -------------·-··-····-...-···---1.3
Harris v. Ogden Steam Laundry Co., 39 Utah
436, 117 p. 700 ----------------------------------····----------------------------15
Miller v. Stephens, 195 N.W. 481._____________________________________ 14
Spencer v. Spencer, 64 N.E:. 947 ________________________________________ 14
Williams v. Jones, 182 P. 391. ___________________________________________ 13
TEXTS CITED
12 Am. J ur.

474-475 ------------~------------------------~--------·---------------17

58 Am. J ur~ 512, Section 3.....,..............................,................12
58 Am. .Jur. 514, Section 6..................-w--·-·····----··-------·---·--12

3 Page

()ll

Conh·acts, 2:ud ]Jd., Section 1442....................14
STATUTES CITED

Rule 58 A (b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure ................ 9
Rule 58 .A (c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure................ 9

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE SUPREME COUR'T
of the

STATE OF UTAH

JACK \Y. :McCOLLUM,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.

No. 7721

J. V. CLOTHIER,
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF AND RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Since the judgment subsequently was entered in
favor of the plaintiff, we accordingly restate the facts
in most particulars in accordance with the evidence most
favorable to the plaintiff, as it was the prerogative of
the court subsequently to believe such evidence rather
than possibly conflicting evidence offered by the defendant.
Mr. Iverson, one of defendant's attorneys, and his
attorney of recordin the matter of the foreclosure of his
mortgage on the Kiest property, obtained plaintiff's
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name and telephone number from Margaret Stewart
(Tr. 60 and 61), the Trustee in Bankruptcy of the Kiest
property after it went into bankruptcy in the middle
part of 1949, and who had disclaimed any interest in
said mortgaged property, for the purpose of having
the plaintiff acquaint him with the various items of
machinery covered by the mortgage. Previously, the
plaintiff had been employed by the Kiest people and
had also ren<iered services for Miss Stewart as a salesman for some of the Kiest machinery not covered by
the mortgaga and as a watchman on the premises. At
Mr. Iverson'$ request (Tr. 6), the plaintiff met him
at the plant. This, of course, was after he had been
relieved of his duties for Miss Stewart, whom he had
labored for in an excellent manner (Tr. 60). Present
at this meeting also were Miss Henrietta McGlone, defendant's other counsel, and J. D. Hooper, who was
employed as a wafuhman. The 1nachinery was checked
off and identified and then the matter of how the machinery was to be disposed of was discussed and just
before they left, Mr. Iverson told the plaintiff to line
up buyers for the machinery (Tr. 7). Plaintiff asked
Iverson how soon the sale of the machinery was to come
about, and he was told two weeks. Upon asking if he
could be sure he was then informed "better make it a
month". This request was made outside the plant when
they were ready to leave (Tr. 35). There was some talk
when they were in the plant and Mr. Iverson there had
asked plaintiff to "keep track" of the buyers that were
interested. The plaintiff, through his efforts in Miss
Stewart's behalf had tnade contact with a number of
2
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persons interested in purchasing certain of these ite1ns
of 1nachinery, and it was in lining up and keeping track
of these purchasers and contacts n1ade through these
purchasers that the plaintiff, at the request of the defendant's agent and with the knowledge of both defendant and his agent, rendered beneficial services which
the defendant availed himself of. Never at any time
during these conversations was a sheriff's or judicial
sale talked about, and plaintiff knew at the time what
a judicial or sheriff's sale was (Tr. 7 and 36).
The list of the machinery showing the prices at
which the items were to sell was given plaintiff previously by :\Ir. Iverson at his office in Salt Lake City (Tr.
9 and 10), and plaintiff was told on that occasion to call
back in half an hour, as to what for apparently he was
not told, but ·when he returned Mr. Iverson had gone so
the plaintiff had to make another trip to Salt Lake to
see him (Tr. 10).
Plaintiff then proceeded to contact firms in Salt
Lake, Ogden, Pocatello, Boise, Weiser, Paul, Rupert
and Burley, Idaho, and Vale, Oregon, and also made a
trip to Los Angeles to contact the manufacturer of the
machinery. The contacts at Boise, Weiser and Vale
were all on the same trip. He made no less than nine
trips to Salt Lake and went to Mr. Iverson's office every
time and was able to see and talk to him the greater
number of these trips about prospective purchasers and
prices (Tr. 11, 36 and 37). He made three trips to Pocatello Idaho on one of which he visited the defendant
'
and 'Miss McGlone
for the purpose of discussing the

3
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price of the building and talking about the machinery,
and on the other two he contacted fabricating steel
plants on the outskirts of town who were interested
in some of the machinery ( Tr. 13, 14 and 50). Everyone
whom plaintiff contacted was interested in one or more
of the various items and they all came to see them (Tr.
11), calling upon the plaintiff when they would come
and he would t~ke them out to the plant to view the
machinery. They were all prepared to pay more than
the price listed on the price list (Tr. 11-19). Some
of the intended purchasers demanded that plaintiff
take down payments on the merchandise, so plaintiff
sought Mr. Iverson's advice and was directed not to
take any money (Tr. 20). This he did, however, and
deposited it in a special account. Later when the date
of the sale dragged on, certain of them became disinterested and plaintiff gave their money back as he did ultimately to all of them (Tr. 20).
Plaintiff had a conversation with Dr. Clothier in
Pocatello sometime in June or July, as he recalls, concerning the land and buildings and also the machinery.
His main purpose in going to Pocatello at that par..
ticular time was because he had a purchaser lined up
who was interested in the land, but he also told the
doctor how he was coming in disposing of the machinery. The following conversation took place at that
meeting, and this is uncontradicted in the record (Tr.
21 and 22):
"A. Well, my big purpose in going to see
him was to find out what he wanted for the building and the land then of course I told him how
4
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I was doing in disposing of the machinery or
having prospective buyers, but I was able to get
from him the approximate amount he was going
to ask for the building and the land, and he told
me he said, "son1ewhere around five thousand dollars, maybe a little more," and that was rnainly
the information I went after .
.. Q. You testified previously you had obtained, or that you had contacted persons who
were interested in the land?

··A.

Yes.

"Q. Specifically the Olson Manufacturing
Company?
''A.

Yes.

"Q. Did you mention that fact to Doctor
Clothier?
"A. Well, when the president of the Olson
:Manufacturing Company came down here, he
asked me to line up the buyers for him. He want~
ed to be kept anonymous. When I was talking
to Doctor Clothier, why he was very much interested in who this buyer would be and I didn't
want to tell him, but he kept, well he kept asking
so I said, "well, it's a subsidiary of MorrisonKnudsen," but he promised he wouldn't say a
word to anybody about it, and then he still had
set the price close to five thousand dollars. I
guess I no sooner left his office than he rnust
have dropped a letter off to Morrison-Knudsen
and asked if they were the parties interested in
the property. They wrote back and said "no,"
which was right. They weren't. The persons that
were interested, I never did let their names get
out until after the sale."
5
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Before the sale, plaintiff mentioned to Mr. Iverson
that he had obtained better prices for the n1achinery
than those listed on the list he was furnished (Tr. 22).
Particularly he remembers a shear that was outside the
building which had some pieces stolen from it and he
several times asked Mr. Iverson what the new price
on it was to be in its stripped down condition; however, he was never told and the new price was not put on·
it until the day of the sale (Tr. 22 and 23).
There were persons present at the sale whom the
plaintiff had contacted and he heard them bid and have
items struck off to them at lower prices than they were
prepared to pay for them according to his contacts
(Tr. 23 and 24).
The plaintiff is a qualified expert in dealing and
selling the type of machinery in question, having started
working in machinery in 1946 and having sold machinery
for ICiest. He understood any and all types of machinery necessary for the fabrication of steel. He knew
what machinery salesmen drew as salary, and that they
drew not less than $350.00 a month in commissions and
expenses, and what they drew as mileage allowances.
The value of his services for the defendant he figured
to be $500.00 a month, and mileage at the rate of six
cents a mile. He stated that he would settle for two
months' compensation even though his services extended
beyond that (Tr. 24, 25 and 26).
On the day of the sale, August 2, 1950, the plaintiff
asked about pay for his services, and Iverson said he
would talk to the doctor, but plaintiff never did heat
from either of them after that (Tr. 27 and 28).
6
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Plaintiff talked with Henrietta :McGlone, the doctor's other counsel, in Pocatello, Idaho in the hospital,
on the sru:ne day he spoke with the doctor. Their conversation dwelt with the n1achinery, the land and the buildings and what the doctor was asking for them. He also
made inquiry for ~lr. Simpson, the caretaker, as to his
wages (Tr. 29). He stated that he had authority to ask
about Simpson's pay (Tr. 37).
~-\.t the close of the evidence and after considerable
argun1ent and comn1ent by the court and counsel, it ruled
that plaintiff had failed to make out a cause of action
and held for the defendant. Between this time and the
time that defendant's proposed findings and judgment
were submitted, the court apparently changed its mind
and felt that the defendant andjor his agent, ~Ir. Iverson, had used the plaintiff and that he was entitled to
some compensation, and that $250.00 would be about
right. Accordingly, he directed counsel for plaintiff to
draw findings and judgment based thereon to which
defendant filed objections which were heard by the court
on April 16, 1951. At the hearing on plaintiff's first
proposed findings and judgment, counsel for defendant
and the court differed in their recollections as to the
evidence, and the court ordered a transcript of plaintiff's testimony prepared and the matter to be heard at
a later date. After reading the testimony the court
apparently changed its mind again and decided that the
plaintiff was entitled to more than he had first given
and ordered counsel for plaintiff to prepare the findings
and judgment appealed from, to which the defendant

7
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also filed objections. Counsel for plaintiff was duly
notified by the clerk of the court that the hearing on
these objections was set for June 4, 1951, and upon this
day counsel attended court prepared to argue same,
and sat through the entire law and motion calendar
waiting for defendant's counsel to arrive. The clerk
informed the court that counsel had been noticed, but
he nevertheless failed to appear, and at the end of the
calendar the findings and judgment appealed from were
signed in open court.
While plaintiff's evidence attempted ·to embrace
services and mileage to Los Angeles, California, Salt
Lake City, Utah, Pocatello, Idaho, Vale, Oregon, and
Boise, Rupert, Paul, Burley and Weiser, Idaho, we call
attention to the fact that plaintiff recovered only for
four trips to Salt Lake from Ogden and return, and
two trips to Pocatello, Idaho and return plus service~
in the sum of $600.00 which the court subsequently felt
should compensate the plaintiff for the time and effort
expended in the defendant's behalf, and which would be
roughly equivalent to two months' wages. This award
is what is before the court now.

PmT I.

.fHI FINDINGS OF f4'10T AND JU1)(I(Ilft' ENTERED 'ftiBRiON .lRi

1

SUPPCJB.T.ID BY THE ltVID.ENCE AID .ARE lOT COITRARI

THDITO•

It should be pointed out that appellant's repeated
use of the opinions expressed by the court during the
8
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trial of the eanse, whirh adn1ittedly favor hiin, at thi~
stage of the proceeding are not material and serve to
show nothing 1nore than what the court's thoughts were
at the moment during the trial. Further, there is no
judgment unless and until signed by the Judge and he
has the prerogative of changing his n1ind if subsequently
the evidence should strike hin1 the other way. Rule 58
~-\. (b) rtah Rules of Civil Procedure provides as follows:
"(b) Judgment in Other Cases. Except as
provided in subdivision (a) hereof and subdivision (b) (1) of Rule 55, all judgments shall bP
signed by the judge and filed with the clerk."
And (c) provides :
·· (c) \Yhen Judgment Entered; Notation in
Register of Actions and Judgment Docket. A
judgment is complete and shall be deemed entered
for all purposes, except the creation of a lien
on real property, when the same is signed and
filed as herein above provided. The clerk shall
immediately make a notation of the judgment in
the register of actions and the judgment docket."
Appellant's remarks as to plaintiff's trips to Vale,
Oregon and every other place indicated also do not
seem material for the reason that plaintiff recovered
only for two trips to Pocatello, Idaho and four trips
to Salt Lake City.
We call attention to the fact that J. D. Hooper, a.
witness for the plaintiff, stated that what he testified
to was all that was said in his presence, "something to
that effect," (Tr. 65), which, of course, was all that he
9
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was called upon for, but this does not preclude other
conTPrsation concerning the matter to have taken place
away frorn his presence and hearing, which, of course,
plaintiff has testified to (Tr. 35).
:Miss McGlone testified that nothing was said concerning any employment at that time, but it must be
remembered that we here seek to recover not on the
basis of a specific and express contract, but on one implied from the request of Mr. Iverson and the subsequent knowledge and encouragement from both the doctor and Mr. Iverson, and, of course, on the basis that
the doctor availed himself of the benefits of plaintiff's
labors in his behalf. Plaintiff has so testified and the
trial court subsequently believed him (Tr. 21, 22 and
36).
Appellant's statement that plaintiff quit without
notice seems unsupported and, in fact, was denied by
the plaintiff (Tr. 47, 48 and 55).
While the court in the April 16th hearing on objections to the first set of plaintiff's findings might have
been mistaken in its recollection of the evidence as to
plaintiff having a key to the premises, the evidence is
uncontroverted to the effect that plaintiff had access
to the plant through the caretaker and made trips there
during the course of the summer to show prospective
purchasers the machinery (Tr. 11, 26, 46, 47 and 48).
This evidence stands uncontradicted in the record. The
court in this same hearing might have been mistaken
also as to its recollection of Dr. Clothier's exact remarks

10
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with re~peet to his knowledge of plaintiff's activities,
but it wa~ not Inistaken in its thought that Dr. Clothier
had knowledge that the plaintiff was perfonning services in his behalf with respect to the machinery and the
land abo. although nothing is claimed as to the land.
This evidence is uncontroverted in the record also (Tr.
:21 and :2~).
It is interesting to note that on cross-examination,
:Mr. Iverson was not too clear in calling to mind the
eyents that transpired. I invite the court's attention to
pages 70, 71, 72 and 85 of the transcript. With respect
to the price list talked about he testified as follows on
cross-examination (Tr. 85-86):

"Q. And you say you didn't give him this
list at your office 1
"A. As I remember, I gave him that list
the day we were at the plant. I had two or three
copies of the list and we were using one list to
check off the items as we checked from iten1 to
item to see whether or not he was turning over
everything that belonged to us. I had two or three
copies of it. I think I gave him one that day.
He asked what the stuff was worth.

"Q. Are you willing to say now categorically
whether you did or didn't 1
"A.

No, I couldn't say that categorically."

Attention is also called to Mr. Iverson's testimony
on direct examination wherein he related the conversation with the plaintiff at the plant specifically with respect to the sale (Tr. 68).
11
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"* * * and I told him that when a sale came
we would very much appreciate having all the
buyers that we could get, and I would appreciate
it if he would keep track of those buyers, and he
asked what prices would be charged, and I said,
'well, it will be a sale, but I can give you what
it's appraised for.' "
Nowhere is there mentioned anything about a judicial. sale. Mr. Iverson also admitted on pre-trial that
there was no doubt but what a number of people may
have attended the sale through plaintiff's efforts. This
was the recollection of the court (Tr. 79).
The general rule as to recovery on quantum meruit
under common counts of assumpsit is set out in 58 Am.
J ur. 512. It is there said in Section 3 dealing with the
subject generally:
"A promise to pay the reasonable value of
services performed by one person for another
although there is no express agreement as to the
compensation thereby implied where the circumstances warrant an inference of a promise to pay
for such services if where the conduct of the person for whom the work was done is such to justify
an understanding by the person performing work
that the former intended to pay for it." Citations.
Section 6 deals with acceptance of services; receipt
of benefit. It is there said:
"In the absence of anything to indicate a
contrary intention of the parties, where one performs for another a useful service of a character
that is usually charged for, and such service is
rendered with knowledge and approval of the
recipient who either expresses no dissent or avails
12
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hhn.self of the services rendered, the law raises
an 1mplied promise on the part of the recipient
to pay the reasonable value of such services."
Citations including a pronouncement by the Supreme Court of Utah to this effect in the case
of Gleason v. Salt Lake City, 94 Utah 1, 74 P. (2)
1225.

It is true that in the instant case nothing was said
concerning compensation, but I submit that this relates
only to what the amount of compensation was to be, not
to whether or not compensation was to be paid. Attention is invited to the case of Williams v. Jones, 182 P.
391, where the plaintiff was requested by the defendant
to perfortn certain services. The defendant urged
strongly that there was no evidence at all to that effect
and relied on a question and answer in the record on
examination of the piaintiff to this effect:
"Was there any agreement between you and
Mr. Jones as to what you were to charge or not~"
"No, nothing said about that at all."
The court, on page 392 said:
"Obviously, this relates only to what the
amount of the charge was to be and not to whether
a charge was to be made."
I submit that such is the situation in the case at bar.
In the same case further on, the Court had this to say,
citing C.J. and R.C.L.:
"A mere request or direction to the plaintiff
would be enough to warrant an inference that it
was to be paid for in the absence that it was to
be gratuitous or that the plaintiff was to be compensated in some other manner."
13
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Attention is also called to the case of City Ice and
Fuel Company v. Bright, 73 Federal (2) 461, wherein
the law implied a contract to pay for information from
circumstances that the parties to whom the information
was furnished recognized its merit, accepted it and
made full use of it as a basis for the purchase of a business. There was no express agreement to pay the plaintiff for the information. It was held that the jury was
not precluded from considering the value of such information under the common counts of assumpsit in the
plaintiff's action for compensation.
Mr. Justice Holmes in Spencer v. Spencer, 64 N.E.
947 said this :
"Again it is not necessary that the defendant
should have believed that the plaintiff expected
pay. If, as a reasonable man he should have understood from what he knew that such was the
expectation, he would be bound by accepting the
services."
In Miller v. Stephens, 195_ N.W. 481, it is said:
"Where there is no express contract, a contract may be implied; in fact, where one engages
or accepts beneficial services of another for which
compensation is customarily made and naturally
anticipated, and although there be no express
stipulation between the parties for wages or price,
the law implies an understanding or intent to pay
the value of the services rendered."
In 3 Page on Contracts, Second Ed., Section 1442,
it is said:

14
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'"If services are rendered at the request of
the person for whom they are rendered, or if
the benefits are accepted voluntarily by such person, there is an implied promise on his part to
make reasonable compensation therefor if no
express contract has been made, if the services
are such as are ordinarily paid for and if the
party who rendered them was not bound to render them without con1pensation."
We submit that the facts of this case fully permit
the application of the foregoing rules of law.
It is further submitted that this being an action at
law, if there is any substantial evidence to support the
judgment, this court will not interfere, and likewise will
not attempt to pass upon what weight should be given
to particular evidence or statements made 'by witnesses.
This is the province of the trial court. Harris v. Ogden
Steam Laundry Co., 39 Utah 436, 117 P. 700.
POINT II
~HE

COURT DID NOT MISLEAD COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT INTO NOT
UTTING IN THE EVIDENCE OF FLOYD SIMPSON FOR THE COURT
liD NOT INDICATE ITS INTENTION TO ENTER JUDGMENT FOR THE
IEFENDANT UNTIL BOTH SIDES HAD RESTED• AND· FURTHER, DEFENIANT1 S OWN NEGLECT WAS THE. CAUSE· OF LOSING. SIMPSONi S TES'IMONY ASSUMING THAT IT WOULD HAVE BEEN BENEFICIAL.
1

At the outset we believe that coun·sel is mistaken
when he states th~t the court, for some time before
counsel for defendant indicated he was re·ady to rest
unless the court desired the evidence of Mr. Simpson,
had repeatedly stated it to be his opinion that plaintiff
had no cause of action. The record does not support thi~.

15
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It shows comment by the court and between counsel and
the court ( Tr. 78-82) and then a resumption of crossexamination (Tr. 83) and a bit of redirect and then defendant rested with the remark about Mr. Simpson (Tr.
89-90). We challenge anyone to glean from these comments and argument (Tr. 78-82) an indicated intention
on the part of the court to enter a judgment for the
defendant. The next comment of the court was after
both sides had rested (Tr. 90). Then the court indicated
that he had an opinion and Mr. Patterson could not
change it.
It occurs to us that perhaps counsel was not particularly diligent with respect to the witness Simpson.
If his testimony was so important and the absence of
it so prejudicial, why did counsel not come armed with
his deposition. We never did receive notice of the taking
of his deposition, and we seriously doubt that he would
have testified as counsel indicates in view of plaintiff's
testimony relative to Simpson's wages (Tr. 29, 37).
There is nothing before us to show any diligence
with respect to obtaining a deposition, or diligence in the
other matters requisite to obtaining a continuance. The
witness was never subpoenaed nor was he ever tendered
any fees, so we fail to see how defendant was prejudiced
other than by his own conduct. The most that can be
said in favor of this proffered testimony is that if it
would have been as defendant indicates then it still
would not have entitled defendant to a continuance,
because its value is merely cumulative or impeaching,

16
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and it must be shown to be more than that. We invite
the court's attention to 12 Am. Jur. 474 and 475 in support of our position in this matter.

CONCLUSION
It certainly does stretch the imagination to contemplate that Mr. McCollum undertook to perform these
services at the request of 1\Ir. Iverson and with the subsequent assent and encouragement of Dr. Clothier as
a complete gratuity, and it is completely unreasonable
to assume that they expected and were led to believe
that he was doing it for nothing. That they knew he
was carrying on this work is unquestioned. One cannot
deny that these services were performed at their request,
that defendant knowingly enjoyed the benefits of them
and reasonably should be expected to pay their worth.
We submit that the court did not err in entering
judgment in favor of the plaintiff.
Respectfully submitted,
CLYDE C. PATTERSON,
RICHARD L. STINE,
Counsel for Plaintiff
and Respondent.
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